Abstract. Due to its remarkable performance and potential resistance to quantum attacks, NTRUEncrypt has drawn much attention recently; it also has been standardized by IEEE. However, classical NTRUEncrypt lacks a strong security guarantee and its security still relies on heuristic arguments. At Eurocrypt 2011, Stehlé and Steinfeld first proposed a variant of NTRUEncrypt with a security reduction from standard problems on ideal lattices. This variant is restricted to the family of rings Z[X]/(X n + 1) with n a power of 2 and its private keys are sampled by rejection from certain discrete Gaussian so that the public key is shown to be almost uniform. Despite the fact that partial operations, especially for RLWE, over Z[X]/(X n + 1) are simple and efficient, these rings are quite scarce and different from the classical NTRU setting. In this work, we consider a variant of NTRUEncrypt over prime cyclotomic rings, i.e. Z[X]/(X n−1 + · · ·+X+1) with n an odd prime, and obtain IND-CPA secure results in the standard model assuming the hardness of worst-case problems on ideal lattices. In our setting, the choice of the rings is much more flexible and the scheme is closer to the original NTRU, as Z[X]/(X n−1 + · · · + X + 1) is a large subring of the NTRU ring Z[X]/(X n − 1). Some tools for prime cyclotomic rings are also developed.
is one of the fastest known lattice-based cryptosystems and regarded as an alternative to RSA and ECC due to its potential of countering attacks by quantum computers. The underlying problem of NTRUEncrypt has been used to design various cryptographic primitives including digital signatures [16] , identity-based encryption [8] and multi-linear maps [11, 23] . In the course of assessing the security of NTRU, Coppersmith and Shamir first claimed in [5] that one can convert breaking NTRU to solving hard problems on the so-called NTRU lattice. Then an army of cryptanalyses [21, 12, 15, 34, 29, 10, 19, 2, 9, 1, 4, 22] have brought security estimations on NTRU and its variants, and NTRU is still considered secure in practice.
The Learning With Errors problem (LWE), introduced by Regev in 2005 [32] , is shown to be as hard as certain lattice problems in the worst case. The Ring Learning With Errors problem (RLWE) is an algebraic variant of LWE, proposed by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [25] , whose hardness is guaranteed by some hard problems over ideal lattices. Due to its better compactness and efficiency over LWE, RLWE has been used as the foundation of new cryptographic applications. In a celebrated paper [33] , Stehlé and Steinfeld first modified NTRUEncrypt by incorporating RLWE and proved that the security of NTRU follows by a reduction from RLWE provided that a right set of parameters are used, which is the first sound theoretical base for the security of NTRU in the asymptotic sense. It is worth noting that several novel ideas and powerful techniques have been developed in [33] . One remarkable contribution is to show that, for n being a power of 2, and private keys f, g sampled according suitable conditions and parameters from the ring Z[X]/(X n + 1), the public key h = f g is close to that uniformly sampled under the statistical distance. Based on the provably secure NTRU scheme, more interesting cryptographic primitives are achieved, such as fully homomorphic encryption [24, 3] , proxy re-encryption [30] .
In most known ring-based cryptosystems, the rings of the form Z[X]/(X 2 m + 1) are preferred choices. This family of rings has some nice algebraic features and various results on it have been already established. However, as these rings are very scarce, it has a limitation on the choice of the rings. It is noted that another family of rings, the prime cyclotomic rings of the form R = Z[X]/(X n−1 + · · · + X + 1) with n being a prime, is also of particular interest in many aspects, especially in the context of RLWE and NTRU. As a large subring, this ring is much closer to the original NTRU ring. It is also remarked that a class of subfield attacks [1] is proposed recently and affects the asymptotic security of NTRU for large moduli q. Note that the subfield attack is not applicable to the setting of [33] , but it is still meaningful to consider NTRU over the fields with no subfields of desired relative degree. In this sense, prime cyclotomic ring seems a good choice of the potential to counter the subfield attack. Establishing IND-CPA (indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack ) secure results with respect to this class of rings will be an important topic. Indeed, as stated in [33] , the results for Z[X]/(X 2 m + 1) are likely to hold for more general cases including that for prime cyclotomic rings. However, to the best of our knowledge, there were no actual discussions on this issue found in literature.
Our Contribution The main purpose of this paper is to study the problem of provable security of NTRU in a modified setting with respect to prime cyclotomic rings. We show results similar to that of [33] still hold over prime cyclotomic rings. Consequently, to instantiate a provably secure NTRU, the density of usable cyclotomic polynomial degree n < N is increased from Θ log N N to Θ 1 log N . Even though some main ideas of [33] are applicable in our discussion, many technical differences also need to be taken care of. Furthermore, some new results on prime cyclotomic rings developed here might be of general interest. We believe that these results could be used to design more applications based on prime cyclotomic rings.
Organization We start in Section 2 with some notations and basic facts that will be useful to our discussion. We shall develop and prove a series of relevant results over prime cyclotomic rings in Section 3. Section 4 describes a modified NTRUEncrypt over prime cyclotomic rings and a reduction to its IND-CPA security from RLWE which has been proven hard under worst-case assumptions on ideal lattices. We conclude in Section 5. We have a couple of results whose proofs are similar to that in [33] , these proofs are included in Appendices A, B and C for completeness.
Preliminaries
Lattice A lattice L is a discrete subgroup of R m and represented by a basis, i.e. there is a set of linearly independent vectors
The integer m is the dimension and the integer n is the rank of L. A lattice is full-rank if its rank equals its dimension. The first minimum λ 1 (L) (resp. λ ∞ 1 (L)) is the minimum of Euclidean (resp. ∞ ) norm of all non-zero vectors of the lattice L. More generally, the k-th minimum λ k (L) for k ≤ n is the smallest r such that there are at least k linearly independent vectors of L whose norms are not greater than r. Given a basis B = (b 1 , · · · , b n ) of a full-rank lattice L, the set P(B) = { i c i b i |c i ∈ [0, 1)} is the fundamental parallelepiped of B whose volume | det(B)| is an invariant of L, called the volume of L and denoted by det(L). The dual lattice of L is the lattice L = {c ∈ R m |∀i, c, b i ∈ Z} of the same dimension and rank with L.
Given a ring R with an additive isomorphism θ mapping R to the lattice θ(R) in an inner product space and an ideal I of R, we call the sublattice θ(I) an ideal lattice. Due to their smaller space requirement and faster operation speed, ideal lattices have been a popular choice for most lattice-based cryptosystems. More importantly, the hardness of classical lattice problems, SVP(Shortest Vector Problem) and γ-SVP(Approximate Shortest Vector Problem with approximation factor γ), does not seem to substantially decrease (except maybe very large approximate factors [6] ). Thus, it is believed that the worst-case hardness of γ-SVP over ideal lattices, denoted by γ-Ideal-SVP, is against subexponential quantum attacks, for any γ ≤ poly(n).
Probability and Statistics Let D be a distribution over a discrete domain E. We write z ← D to represent the random variable z that is sampled from the distribution D and denote by D(x) the probability of z evaluates to x ∈ E. We denote by U (E) the uniform distribution over a finite domain E. For two distributions
Gaussian Measures We denote by ρ r,c (x) the n-dimensional Gaussian function with center c ∈ R n and width r, i.e. ρ r,c (x
. When the center is 0, the Gaussian function is simply written as ρ r (x). Let S be a subset of R n , we denote by ρ r,c (S) (resp. ρ r (S)) the sum x∈S ρ r,c (x) (resp. x∈S ρ r (x)). Let D L,r,c be the discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice L with center c and width r, the probability of a vector x ∈ L under this distribution is
ρr,c(L) . For δ > 0, the smoothing parameter η δ (L) is the smallest r > 0 such that ρ 1/r ( L) ≤ 1 + δ. The smoothing parameter is bounded in terms of some lattice quantities. The following lemmata will be useful in our discussion.
n be a full-rank lattice and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 2 ([31], Le. 3.5). Let L ⊆ R n be a full-rank lattice and δ ∈ (0, 1).
.
Lemma 3 ([28]
, Le. 4.4). Let L ⊆ R n be a full-rank lattice and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 5 ([14] , Th. 4.1). There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a basis
n , outputs samples from a distribution statistically close to D L,r,c with respect to n. Furthermore, we denote by ψ r the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and width r over R and by ψ n r the spherical Gaussian distribution over R n of the vector (v 1 , · · · , v n ) in which each v i is drawn from ψ r independently. In this paper, we shall restrict ψ r over Q rather than R. As explained in [7] , this will only lead to a negligible impact on our results.
Cyclotomic Ring Let ξ n be a primitive n-th complex root of unity and Φ n (X) the n-th cyclotomic polynomial. It is known that Φ n (X) ∈ Z[X] and is of degree ϕ(n), the totient of n. All roots of Φ n (X) form the set {ξ i n |i ∈ Z * n }. In this paper, we will be working with a cyclotomic ring of the form R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). For any prime n, if a prime q satisfies q = 1 mod n, then Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q. Given n, the existence of infinite such primes is guaranteed by Dirichlet's theorem on arithmetic progressions. Furthermore, by Linnik's theorem, the smallest such q can be bounded by poly(n) (a more precise bound O(n 5.2 ) has been proven in [36] ). Another important class of rings involved in our discussion is the family of rings of the form R q = R/qR. As indicated earlier, our main focus will be prime cyclotomic rings, i.e. those rings associate with polynomials Φ n (X) = X n−1 + X n−2 + · · · + 1 with n a prime. Given a positive integer n, we define the polynomial Θ n (X) to be X n − 1 if n is odd, and X n 2 + 1 if n is even. It is easy to see that there is a natural ring extension R = Z[X]/Θ n (X) of the cyclotomic ring R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). In particular, when n > 1 is a power of 2, R = R ; when n is a prime, the relation Θ n (X) = Φ n (X) · (X − 1) implies a ring isomorphism R R × Z by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Hardness of RLWE The "pure" Ring Learning With Errors problem (RLWE) introduced in [25] involves the dual of the ring. For the ring Z[X]/(X 2 m + 1), its dual is just a scaling of itself. Therefore, many RLWE instances are established over such rings to avoid dual. In [7] , Ducas and Durmus proposed an "easy-touse" RLWE setting and instantiated RLWE over prime cyclotomic rings. In this paper, we follow the setting of [7] .
Definition 1 (RLWE error distribution in [7] ). Let R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Given ψ a distribution over Q[X]/Θ n (X), we define ψ as the distribution over R obtained by e = e mod Φ n (X) ∈ R with e ← ψ. Here we denote by f the polynomial whose coefficients are derived by rounding coefficients of f to the nearest integers.
Definition 2 (RLWE distribution in [7] ). Let R = Z[X]/Φ n (X) and R q = R/qR. For s ∈ R q and ψ a distribution over Q[X]/Θ n (X), we define A s,ψ as the distribution over R q × R q obtained by sampling the pair (a, as + e) where a ← U (R q ) and e ← ψ.
Definition 3 (RLWE q,ψ,k ). Let R = Z[X]/Φ n (X) and R q = R/qR. The problem RLWE q,ψ,k in the ring R is defined as follows. Given k samples drawn from A s,ψ where s ← U (R q ) and k samples from U (R q × R q ), distinguish them with an advantage 1/ poly(n).
The following theorem indicates that RLWE under the above settings is hard based on the worst-case hardness of γ-Ideal-SVP. The ideal lattices we discuss here are with respect to the so-called canonical embedding, i.e. θ(f ) = (f (ξ i n )) i∈Z * n . Theorem 1 ( [7] , Th. 2). Let n be an odd prime, and let R q be the ring Z q [X]/Φ n (X) where q is a prime congruent to 1 modulo 2n. Also, let α ∈ (0, 1) be a real number such that αq > ω( √ log n). There exists a randomized quantum reduction from γ-Ideal-SVP on ideal lattices in Z[X]/Φ n (X) to RLWE q,ψ n t ,k for t = √ nαq
) that runs in time O(q · poly(n)). 
New Results on Prime Cyclotomic Rings
In this section, we will report on a series of results on prime cyclotomic rings. Some of the results are adapted from corresponding conclusions in [33] , but the modifications are not trivial considering the differences between the cyclotomic rings of prime and a power of 2 orders. Firstly, we present several notations and basic properties aiming at prime cyclotomic rings.
Notations and Properties
Let n be a prime and R be the ring
by coefficient embedding. Given s, t ∈ R m , their Euclidean inner product is denoted by s, t . To get a clean expression of s, t as a coefficient of a polynomial related to s and t, we introduce two operations on f ∈ R as follows.
Let f ∈ R of coefficient vector (f 0 , · · · , f n−2 ), we define f to be the polynomial
One important consequence is that, regarding and as two functions over R, these operations are inverse to each other, namely Proposition 1. Let n be a prime and
) and (h 0 , · · · , h n−2 ) be the coefficient vectors of the polynomials f and f respectively. According to the definitions of these two operations, we have
Then, a straightforward computation leads to that
Thus we conclude that
The following lemma manifests an expression of the Euclidean inner product of two elements in R.
Lemma 6. Let n be a prime and
) be the coefficient vector of the polynomial g . Notice that the term X n is equivalent to the identity element of R. Hence X −1 is equivalent to X n−1 when it comes to the algebraic computations over R. Then we have
i=0 and g n−2 are the coefficients of the polynomial (g ) = g. Consequently, the con-
Corollary 1. Let n be a prime and
Remark For the ring Z[X]/(X n + 1), the Euclidean inner product of any two elements f and g equals the constant coefficient of the polynomial f (X)g(X −1 ), which is simpler than the case in our discussion. The rather involved expression of Euclidean inner product contributes to a sequence of technical differences compared to that in [33] . Now we introduce several norms and demonstrate some relations among them. For any t ∈ R, we define its T 2 -norm by T 2 (t)
Also we define the polynomial norm t by the Euclidean norm of the coefficient vector of t.
Lemma 7. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). For any t ∈ R, we have
Proof. The first inequality can be proven directly by arithmetic-geometric inequality. Since
is the Parseval's identity [35] , the second one follows immediately, as t (1) 2 ≥ 0.
Moreover, we present the following result to illustrate that the product of two polynomials in R is of well-bounded norm.
Lemma 8. Let n be a prime and R
Proof. Let R = Z[X]/(X n − 1) and f , g ∈ R be the polynomials with the same coefficients as f, g respectively, i.e. the coefficients of X n−1 are 0. Let h = n−1 i=0 h i X i be the product of f and g in R where h i ∈ Z for i ∈ {0, · · · , n−1}.
) and (g 0 , · · · , g n−2 ) be the coefficient vectors of f and g. We also set f n−1 = g n−1 = 0. For any i ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}, we have h i = n−1 j=0 f j g (i−j) mod n . By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we know that |h i | ≤ f g . Therefore
By equivalence of norms, we conclude that
Remark The second inequality indicates that an upper bound of the multiplicative expansion factor of R, which is γ × (R) = max f,g∈R f g f g , is 2
√ n − 1. This is comparable to that of power-of-2 cyclotomic rings in the asymptotic sense, as the expansion factor of the ring Z[X]/(X n + 1) is exactly √ n (see [13] ).
Duality Results for Module Lattices
In [33] , Stehlé and Steinfeld reveals a nice duality between two module lattices for the n-th cyclotomic ring with n a power of 2. However, that duality cannot be simply generalized to the case of prime cyclotomic rings. Next, we will propose a new duality relationship between two module lattices for a prime cyclotomic ring.
To begin with, we introduce a few families of R-modules. Let q be a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and R q = R/qR. We denote by {φ i } i=1,··· ,n−1 all roots of Φ n (X) modulo q. Note that if φ is a root of Φ n (X) modulo q, then so is φ −1 mod q. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we see that
From this, we see that each ideal of R q is of the form i∈S (X − φ i ) · R q with S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1}, and we denote it by I S . Let R × q be the set of all invertible elements of R q . Given a ∈ R m q , we define two R-modules a ⊥ (I S ) and L(a, I S ) in exactly the same manner as in [33] :
Then we can define a new R-module L (a, I S ) to be
Module lattices a ⊥ (I S ) and L (a, I S ) can be related by duality argument. More precisely, Lemma 9. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Let q be a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and R q = R/qR. Given S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1} and a ∈ R m q , let a × ∈ R m q be defined by a
and I × S be the ideal i∈S (X − φ −1 i ) · R q whereS is the complement of S. Then (considering both sets as m(n − 1)-dimensional lattices by identifying R with
Proof. Firstly, we prove that
), Corollary 1 says that their inner product t, t equals the constant coefficient of the polynomial
) and Proposition 1, there exists s ∈ R q such that (t i mod q) = a
Both two sums in the right hand side evaluate to 0 in R q , which means that t, t = 0 mod q. Therefore, we finish the proof of this part.
Secondly, it suffices to prove that L (a × , I
For the same reason, we have (qt i mod q) ∈ I S for any i ∈ {1, · · · , m}. If we set s = 1, then (a
). It shows that the polynomial
Combining the fact that (qt i mod q) ∈ I S , we conclude that q(t 1 , · · · , t m ) ∈ a ⊥ (I S ). The proof is completed.
Remark The above result on the duality is different from that proven in [33] , because the inner product has a more involved form. The original ideas of [33] have been exploited here, but we also add more details to treat technical differences.
On the Absence of Unusually Short Vector in L (a, I S )
We now show that for a ← U((R × q ) m ), the first minimum of L (a, I S ) for the ∞ norm is overwhelming unlikely unusually small. First we observe that the lattice L (a, I S ) is transformed from the lattice L(a, I S ). To describe the transformation, we define a matrix H ∈ Z m(n−1)×m(n−1) as
where Id m is an m-dimensional identity matrix. Let B ∈ Z m(n−1)×m(n−1) be a basis of L(a, I S ) whose rows correspond to the basis vectors, then B = B · H is a basis of L (a, I S ). It is thus easy to see that L (a, I S ) and L(a, I S ) are of the same volume, i.e. det L (a,
. Also, the first minimums of these two lattices may not have a significant difference. Hence we first present a result on L(a, I S ) which is a variant on prime cyclotomic rings of Lemma 8 in [33] .
Lemma 10. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Let q be a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and R q = R/qR. For any S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1}, m ≥ 2 and > 0, set
Remark The above lemma can be shown by following the original idea but with some slight modifications on the inequalities for different norms in prime cyclotomic rings. For completeness, we give a proof in Appendix A. It is also noted that our statement of the lemma is essentially the same as that in Lemma 8 of [33] , this is primarily because there is a simple relation for the Euclidean and algebraic norms in both prime and power-of-2 cyclotomic rings. Next, we shall show that the first minimum λ
Lemma 11. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Let q be a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and R q = R/qR.
Proof. We first show that X n−1
t ∞ for any t ∈ R. Let (t 0 , · · · , t n−2 ) be the coefficient vector of t. We denote by (t 0 , · · · , t n−2 ) and (t 0 , · · · , t n−2 ) the coefficient vectors of the polynomials t and X n−1 2 t , then:
j=i t j , we get
Notice that each t i is a sum of consecutive t j 's of length at most
to L(a, I S ) and thus the vector s = X n−1
Since there exists a unique s ∈ L(a, I S ) such that r = s for any r ∈ L (a, I S ), we conclude that λ
Lemmata 10 and 11 lead to the following result on L (a, I S ) immediately.
Lemma 12. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Let q be a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and R q = R/qR. For any S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1}, m ≥ 2 and > 0, set
√ n q β with probability ≥ 1 − 
Results on Regularity
Let D χ be the distribution of the tuple (
m × R q with a i 's being independent and uniformly random in R × q and t i 's being sampled from the distribution χ over R q . We call the statistical distance between D χ and the uniform distribution over (R × q ) m × R q the regularity of the generalized knapsack function (t 1 , · · · , t m ) → m i=1 t i a i . In [27] , Micciancio gave some results on regularity for general finite rings and constructed a class of one-way functions. In [33] , an improved result was claimed for the ring Z[X]/(X n + 1) with n a power of 2 and a Gaussian distribution χ.
We can derive the result of the regularity for prime cyclotomic rings. It provides a foundation of security for more cryptographic primitives based on prime cyclotomic rings. In the later part, we will concentrate on NTRU applications corresponding to the case m = 2.
Lemma 13. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Let q be a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and 
In particular, for all except a fraction ≤ 2 n−1 (q − 1)
Proof. By combining Lemmata 2, 4, 9 and 12, the first part follows. For a ∈ (R × q ) m , the lattice a ⊥ (I S ) is of the volume det a
, thus we complete the proof of the second part.
Remark Our regularity result is under the coefficient embedding. We have also considered the canonical embedding and generalized some results of [26] . In the latter case, for δ = q − n with ∈ (0, 1), the polynomial factor of the lower bound of required width gets reduced to O(n 1.5 ) from O(n 2 ) in Lemma 13 and the power exponent can also be slightly smaller. However, our key result, which is Theorem 2 in next section, requires the parameter δ in Lemma 13 to be very small. Under the canonical embedding and with δ = q −n− n , a desired result similar to the lemma is not currently available. Thus we only work with the coefficient embedding in this paper and leave the relevant results for our next work.
Bounded Gap of Ideal Lattices
Let I be an ideal of the n-th cyclotomic ring and L I be the ideal lattice corresponding to I (under the coefficient embedding). For the case that n is a power of 2, one has λ ϕ(n) (L I ) = λ 1 (L I ). For n being a prime, however, we do not know whether this nice property hold or not, but we are able to show that the gap between λ n−1 (L I ) and λ 1 (L I ) is bounded by √ n.
Lemma 14. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). For any non-zero ideal I of R, we have:
Proof. Let a = (a 0 , · · · , a n−2 ) be a non-zero shortest vector of L I and a ∈ R be the polynomial of coefficient vector a. Then the polynomial
n−2 . For any k ∈ {1, · · · , n − 2}, the coordinates of a (k) can be represented by the a i 's as follows:
Then, we have
All these a (k) 's and a are linearly independent so that we conclude that λ n−1 (
Back to the ring R q , combining Minkowski's theorem, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Let q be a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and R q = R/qR. Let S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1} and denote by L I S the lattice generated by the ideal q, i∈S (X − φ i ) . Then
Revised NTRUEncrypt over Prime Cyclotomic Rings
In this section, we will describe a variant of NTRUEncrypt over prime cyclotomic rings with provable security under the worst-case hardness assumption. The revised NTRUEncrypt is determined by parameters n, q, p, r, α, k and denoted by NTRUEncrypt (n, q, p, r, α, k). First, we choose a prime n ≥ 7 and let R be the ring Z[X]/Φ n (X). Then we pick a prime q = 1 mod n so that Φ n (X) = n−1 i=1 (X − φ i ) mod q with distinct φ i 's, and let R q = R/qR. The parameter p ∈ R × q is chosen to be of small norm, such as p = 2, 3 or p = x+2. The parameter r is the width of discrete Gaussian distribution used for key generation. The parameters α and k are used for RLWE error generation. We list below three main components of NTRUEncrypt (n, q, p, r, α, k) :
∈ R × q , resample. Then return private key sk = f ∈ R × q with f = 1 mod p and public key
, set s, e ← ψ n t and return ciphertext C = hs + pe + M ∈ R q .
-Decryption. Given ciphertext C and private key f , compute C = f · C mod q and return C mod p.
Next we explain when and why the scheme works and how to assess its security.
Key Generation
In the above key generation algorithm, we generate the polynomials f and g by using a discrete Gaussian sampler. Lemma 5 provides a sampler outputting a distribution within exponentially small statistical distance to a certain discrete Gaussian. Actually, the conditions in our results are more demanding than that in Lemma 5. Ignoring the negligible impact, we assume we already have a polynomial-time perfect discrete Gaussian sampler.
To ensure both f and g are invertible modulo q, we may need to resample quite a few times. The following result indicates that the key generation algorithm terminates in expected polynomial time for some selective parameters.
Lemma 15. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Let q be a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and R q = R/qR.
holds for a ∈ R and p ∈ R × q .
Proof. It suffices to bound the probability that p·f +a belongs to I := q, X−φ k by (1/q + 2δ) for any k ≤ n − 1. First we have λ n−1 (L I ) ≤ nq 1 n−1 by Corollary 2 since the ideal I corresponds to I {k} . This, together with Lemma 1, implies that r ≥ η δ (L I ). Applying Lemma 4, we have that the probability of p · f + a = 0 mod I does not exceed 1/q + 2δ.
Next, we claim that the norms of f and g are small with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 16. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Suppose q > 8n is a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and
. The secret key polynomials f , g satisfy, with probability ≥ 1 − 2 −n+4 , f ≤ 2n p r and g ≤ √ n − 1r.
Proof. Setting δ = 1 10(n−1)−1 , then we get r ≥ ln(2(n−1)(1+1/δ)) π from the assumption. Applying Lemma 1 to Z n−1 , we know that r ≥ η δ (Z n−1 ). Therefore, we can use Lemma 3 to get,
Since r ≥ n ln(2(n−1)(1+1/δ)) π · q 1/(n−1) , Lemma 15 yields
This means that the norm of the key polynomial g is less than r √ n − 1 with probability ≥ 1 − 2 4−n . The same argument holds true for the polynomial f such that f = p · f + 1.
If deg p = 0, we have f ≤ 1 + p f ≤ 2 p r √ n − 1 with probability ≥ 1 − 2 4−n . For general cases, applying Lemma 8, we know that f ≤ 1 + p f ≤ 1 + 2(n − 1) p r ≤ 2n · p r with probability ≥ 1 − 2 4−n .
We are also able to prove that the public key h, the ratio of pg and f = pf +1, enjoys a favorable uniformity for some well-chosen r's, just like that shown in [33] . We denote by D × r,z the discrete Gaussian
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Suppose q > 8n is a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and R q = R/qR. Let 0 < < 1 2 and r ≥ (n − 1)
for p ∈ R × q , y i ∈ R q and z i = −y i p −1 mod q for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Remark Our proof follows essentially the same approach as in [33] . For completeness, we include it in Appendix B. This result provides a new instance of Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio(DSPR) assumption introduced in [24] .
Decryption
Just like in the classical NTRUEncrypt, the correctness of decryption is based on the fact that a polynomial of ∞ norm < q/2 is invariant under modulo q reduction. In our decryption procedure, we have C = f · C = pgs + pf e + f M mod q. When pgs + pf e + f M ∞ < q 2 , C is in fact pgs + pf e + f M and hence C mod p = f M mod p = M due to f = 1 mod p, i.e. the decryption succeeds. Now we are to confirm that, given a set of proper parameters, the ∞ norms of pgs, pf e and f M will be small enough (e.g., less than q 6 ) with high probability. This ensures a successful decryption.
We first show that the polynomial drawn from RLWE error distribution has a relatively small norm with a high probability.
Lemma 17. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). For t > 1 and u > 0, we have Pr
Proof. We will need the following inequality in our proof:
In fact, for x ∈ R, we have (
A routine computation leads to the result.
In our estimation, we need traces tr(Σ), tr(Σ 2 ) and the operator norm Σ . It is easy to check that tr(Σ) = 2(n − 1), tr(Σ 2 ) = (n − 1)(n + 2). It can be calculated that the characteristic polynomial of Σ is λ(λ − 1) n−2 (λ − n), so n is the largest eigenvalue of Σ and hence Σ = n.
All coordinates of b follow the distribution ψ t independently, so the coordinates of v follow standard Gaussian independently. As shown in [20] , an tail bound for Mv 2 holds Pr Mv 2 > 2(n − 1) + 2 (n − 1)(n + 2)u + 2nu
Then it can be verified that
thus we have
Setting u in Lemma 17 to Θ(log 1+κ n) and applying Lemmata 16,8, we are able to get the following:
n p 2 rt with probability at least 1 − n −Θ(log κ n) .
Furthermore, if deg p = 0,then
n p 2 rt with probability at least 1 − n
It is also hoped that f M has smaller norm. Indeed, we can prove Lemma 19. In NTRUEncrypt (n, q, p, r, α, k), we have
p holds, and with probability at least 1 − 2 −n+4 , f M ∞ ≤ 2n p 2 r holds.
Proof. By reducing modulo the pX i 's, we can write M into n−2 i=0 i pX i with −1/2 < i ≤ 1/2. Using Lemma 8, we have
For the case deg p = 0, we have
p . Then, combining Lemmata 16 and 8 with the above result, the proof is completed.
Overall, we give a set of parameters such that NTRUEncrypt decrypts correctly with high probability.
Theorem 3. If ω n 2 log 0.5 n p 2 rt/q < 1(resp. ω n log 0.5 n p 2 rt/q < 1 if
> 1, then the decryption algorithm of NTRUEncrypt recovers M with probability 1 − n −ω(1) over the choice of s, e, f, g.
Security Reduction and Parameters
In a manner similar to [33] , we are able to establish a security reduction of NTRUEncrypt from the decisional RLWE × HN F . One technical idea is that one can produce a legal pair of public key and ciphertext pair (h = pa, C = pb + M = hs + pe + M ) by using the pair (a, b = as + e) sampled from RLWE distribution. The proof of Lemma 20 is shown in Appendix C.
Lemma 20. Let n ≥ 8 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Suppose q > 8n is a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q
, and r ≥ (n − 1) 2 ln(8nq) · q 1 2 + . If there exists an IND-CPA attack against the variant of NTRUEncrypt that runs in time T and has success probability 1/2 + δ, then there exists an algorithm solving RLWE q,ψ,k with ψ = ψ n t that runs in time T = T + O(kn) and has success probability
Now we integrate all above results and discuss the parameter requirements. To ensure the uniformity of public keys, the parameters r, n and q should satisfy the condition claimed in Theorem 2, i.e. r ≥ (n − 1)
To ensure a high probability of success decryption, we need that t = √ nαq
> 1 and ω n 2 log 0.5 n p 2 rt/q < 1 (resp. ω n log 0.5 n p 2 rt/q < 1 if deg p = 0) as stated in Theorem 3. To satisfy the condition of RLWE (Theorem 1), it requires that αq > ω( √ log n). From these requirements, to obtain a variant of NTRUEncrypt with provable security against IND-CPA attack, we may set main parameters as follows.
-q = poly(n), ∈ 0, = Ω(n 0.75 log 0.5 n).
If p is set to be an integer(i.e. deg p = 0) which is a most routine case used in NTRUEncrypt scheme, the parameters may be relaxed:
-q = poly(n), ∈ 0, 1 2 , and q
= Ω(n 0.75 log 0.5 n).
Combining with Theorem 1, we have obtained our main result.
Theorem 4. Let n ≥ 8 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φ n (X). Suppose q = poly(n) is a prime such that Φ n (X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and q 1 2 − = ω n 4.75 log 1.5 n p 2 (resp. q ists an IND-CPA attack against the variant of NTRUEncrypt (n, q, p, r, α, k) that runs in time poly(n) and has success probability In the modified NTRUEncrypt, the parameter r isΩ(n 2 · q 1 2 + ) and that in [33] isΩ(n · q 1 2 + ). Note tha the term q 1 2 + is much greater than its polynomial coefficient n 2 or n, thus, in this sense, our result is close to that for power-of-2 cyclotomic rings. By setting = o(1) and p to be of degree 0, the smallest modulus q and approximate factor γ reachΩ(n 7.5 ) andΩ(n 8 ) respectively. These compare toΩ(n 5 ) andΩ(n 5.5 ) for NTRUEncrypt over power-of-2 cyclotomic rings.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we extended the provable security of an NTRU variant, originally proposed by Stehlé and Steinfeld for power-of-2 cyclotomic rings, to the family of prime cyclotomic rings. As this class of rings is closer to the original NTRU rings, the results here may bring a new security estimation for the original NTRU settings. We also developed a series of tools for prime cyclotomic rings that provide a foundation to generalize more cryptosystems to this class of rings. These tools might be of some independent interest. We present a theoretical construction with suggested parameters in the asymptotic sense. There are a batch of cryptanalyses work aiming at NTRU, such as hybrid attack [19] , subfield attack [1] and straightforward attack [22] . Detailed analyses of our NTRU variant against these attacks should be well-considered. Furthermore, the operations over the rings Z[X]/(X n ± 1) are still more efficient than that over prime cyclotomic rings. The further investigation of the relation between the prime cyclotomic ring and NTRU ring may improve the efficiency of related cryptosystems. We leave them to the future work.
As shown in [26, 25] , canonical embedding provides a neat description of the geometry of cyclotomic rings, which may lead to more compact and general results. To get similar conclusions with respect to the canonical embedding, we need to develop more powerful tools and that is left as a future investigation.
The ideal lattices (under the coefficient embedding) over prime cyclotomic rings are not (anti-)circulant, thus to study the gap between their minimums could be useful in cryptanalysis. Another interesting problem is a finer estimation of Euclidean norm of elements in an ideal of the prime cyclotomic ring, as it is useful in reducing some complexity estimations.
The constant coefficient of h 0 is non-zero modulo prime q, so the polynomial t will be determined once the (n − 1 − d) low-order coefficients of t are determined, and vice versa. Thus each possible t is uniquely decided by its (n−1−d) low-order coefficients and this leads to
Notice that the number of subsets of S is 2 |S| and the number of s ∈ R q /I S divisible by h = i∈S (X − φ i ) of degree d is q |S|−d . Thus the probability p can be bounded as follows:
Since n ≥ 7, q = 1 mod n and β ≤ 1 − 
We now complete the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 2
For a ∈ R × q , we define P r a = P r f1,f2 ((y 1 + pf 1 )/(y 2 + pf 2 ) = a), where f i ← D × r,zi . It suffices to prove that |P r a −(q−1)
for all except a fraction ≤ (q−1) (n−1) of a ∈ R × q . To translate Pr a into a more straightforward form, we introduce another probability P r a = P r f1,f2 [a 1 f 1 + a 2 f 2 = a 1 z 1 + a 2 z 2 ] for a = (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ (R × q ) 2 , and then obtain P r a = P r −a2·a .
Thanks to a ∈ (R × q ) 2 , for any (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ a ⊥ , the elements x 1 and x 2 lie in the same ideal I S of R q . To circumvent the restriction on invertibility, we exploit the inclusion-exclusion principle and change the three above sums into the following forms. Next, we are to prove the Equation (2) . Let δ = q −(n−1)/2 . Lemma 2 shows that λ n−1 (L I S ) ≤ n · q |S|/(n−1) . For S of cardinality ≤ (n − 1)/2, by Lemma 1, we get that r ≥ η δ (I S + qZ n−1 ). Using Lemma 4, we know |D Z n−1 ,r,−zi (I S + qZ n−1 ) − q −|S| | ≤ 2δ. For the case |S| > (n − 1)/2, using the same argument, we have D Z n−1 ,r,−zi (I S + qZ n−1 ) ≤ 2δ + q −(n−1)/2 . Therefore, Overall, we prove that, except for a fraction ≤ where |δ i | ≤ 2 2n q − (n−1) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, which implies that |P r a − (q − 1) −(n−1) | ≤ .
C Proof of Lemma 20
Let A be the given IND-CPA attack algorithm. Given oracle O that outputs k samples drawn from either U (R 
